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I. Research-background and the analysed social problem 
Early school leaving and long-term unemployment among low 
skilled young people lead to permanent social tensions not only in 
the developing world, but also in the developed countries. The 
adverse demographic and economic trends have exacerbated the 
problem in the last few years. Currently, one tenth (11.9%) of the 
school-age population leaves public education in the European 
Union (EU), without finishing secondary school (ISCED 0-2 levels). 
In some countries (Spain, Portugal, etc.) this proportion can be as 
high as 20-25 per-cent. As a result, tens of -thousands of European 
children are excluded from public education each year, despite the 
fact, that school participation is free of charge and a fundamental 
right for all EU citizens. 
Early school leaving (ESL) is a significant problem also at the 
individual level, because the affected children are excluded from the 
knowledge and learning that can only be acquired at school. Children 
who drop-out of school leave the sphere of influence of their peer-
group and the regular supervision by teachers. ESL leads to serious 
problems at the level of the market economy as well. Only one-third 
of early school leavers are able to find a job on the primary labour 
market within 1-3 years after leaving school. In some EU countries 
(Italy, Bulgaria, etc.) only one of ten ESL-affected young people 
become part of the employed population. At best, the knowledge and 
service-based economies of the 21th century can only partially 
absorb the poorly qualified workforce. The scarce number of jobs 
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that are available for low-qualified people tend to be temporary and 
poorly paid. Therefore, early school leaving leads to individual 
tragedies by exacerbating poverty and social exclusion, and also 
results widespread social problems. 
In its 2010 Lisbon Treaty, the European Union recognized the 
significant problems associated with ESL and designated it as a 
particularly important area of community-level intervention. Thus, 
the EU 2020 Strategy calls on the member states to reduce their ESL 
rate to below 10 per-cent among young people between the ages of 
15 and 34. Member states can work out the basic principles and 
methods of intervention independently, and they can integrate these 
practices into their national strategies. Some countries made attempts 
to fight against school leaving and truancy by maintaining 
counselling services, mentor programmes, student information 
centres and training for teachers (Sweden, Finland, Germany, etc.). 
Other countries introduced large nationwide social- and education-
based scholarship programs for the affected social groups (Slovakia, 
United Kingdom, etc.). Other group of countries tried to tackle early 
school leaving and drop-out by tying different family allowances to 
the compulsory education of children. The practice of providing 
allowance to parents, if they take care of the schooling of their 
children has been effective. When students miss a certain number of 
classes at school, parents must face sanctions. These sanctions 




From 1993 to 2008, six current EU member state (Belgium, 
Bulgaria, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Romania and Slovakia) and 
two countries nominated for EU membership (Turkey and 
Macedonia) introduced conditional cash transfers (CCT) in their 
welfare policies. Over the past few years, some countries have 
eliminated the education-related conditions tied to these transfers 
(Romania and United Kingdom), while others have returned to CCTs 
after a short brake (Hungary). Some countries still maintain CCTs 
and plan to introduce new conditional transfers (Bulgaria and 
Slovakia). Information available on European CCTs is quite limited, 
because only a few analyses and reports have been carried out on this 
subject so far (Friedman et al. 2009, TÁRKI 2012). 
Attempting to fill the gap of missing information in 2013 TÁRKI 
carried out a profound analysis of CCT programmes placed in 
Bulgaria, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Hungary and Turkey. The 
research incorporated two phases: the first phase consisted of 
document analysis, in the second phase the research staff carried out 
qualitative interviews. In each case the interviews were conducted on 
location with the involvement of decision-makers, social policy 
experts and NGO representatives. As a result, there were 
considerable similarities across the analyzed CCT practicing 
countries in the project goals, applied methods and the expectations 
of decision makers. Despite these similarities, the programmes 
showed notable differences in the methods of implementation, the 
diversity of the socioeconomic environment and targeting methods. 
Michelle de Sa e Silva (2010:1) noted that CCTs from different 
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countries are “united in theory, but divorced in practice”, considering 
the differing social, economic and political circumstances of 
programme implementation. My dissertation is significantly based 
on the professional experiences and results I acquired as a member 
of TÁRKI’s team during the CCT related research programmes 
between 2011 and 2014. 
 
II. Methodology 
For the method of my analysis, I chose Wilhelm Cauer’s 1941 Black 
Box model, which is a proper method for the profound evaluation of 
social policy interventions. This model can be used in case, where 
the inputs and outputs of a policy decision are well known, but the 
period that has elapsed between the decision making and policy 
actions is ambiguous. During my research, I attempted to reveal and 
identify the hidden content of Black Box (White Box or Glass Box) 
and focused on the attitudes, expectations and opinions of decision 
makers regarding local CCTs. 
The data collection method used in my research is based on two 
fundamental practices, following the methodology of TÁRKI’s 
2013/2014 study. The first one incorporates a document analysis. I 
evaluated international and national publications, governmental and 
IMF/World Bank documents as well as feasibility studies, project 
reports and loan agreements regarding education-based CCTs in the 
chosen countries. In the second chapter of my research, I used 
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quantitative interviews involving decision-makers, experts on social 
policy and education-related issues, and representatives of non-
governmental organizations. 
In the first part of my thesis, I analyse the international proliferation 
and implementation of CCT programmes. I describe theories on 
policy transferability and learning, and discuss the role that 
international organizations played in the world-wide distribution of 
CCTs. Based on the basic approach of the dissertation, CCTs 
function as a global solution for the education-related problems of 
the poor and these programmes can appear in various forms in 
different counties and regions of the world. I attempt to reveal the 
trend, through which the so called “CCT wave” first emerged in the 
Anglo-Saxon countries, was later entrenched in the development 
policy of the World Bank, became implemented in the Latin-
American countries, and eventually appeared on the European 
continent. 
In the second part of my thesis, I carry out case studies on CCT 
programmes that are in place in three EU countries (Bulgaria, 
Belgium and Hungary). During the selection process, the criteria 
were that the chosen counties were required to maintain active 
conditional cash transfer programmes and be members of the 
European Union. Although the analysed countries are all members of 
the EU, they have quite different social, economic and political 
characteristics. These differences allow me to examine CCTs in a 
rather heterogeneous socioeconomic environment. 
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In my dissertation, I analyze the proliferation, implementation and 
operation of CCTs using the theories of policy transfers (Steiner-
Khamsi 2004) and globalised social policies (Deacon 2009). I focus 
primarily on the role that the international organizations (Deacon 
2012, Feenstra 2010, Banks et al. 2004) played in the dispersion and 
implementation of CCTs. According to the hypothesis of policy 
transfers, CCTs originated from the Anglo-Saxon countries and 
spread throughout in the world with the aid of some so called 
intermediary organizations (The World Bank, IMF and the EU). The 
countries which maintained a financial relationship with these 
economic organizations were the most affected by the proliferation 
of CCTs. The global institutions - directly or indirectly – called for 
the introduction of conditional transfers in the area of the “too 
generous” family benefits and installed these requirements in the 
financial loan agreements as well.  
First, I analyze the development activity of international economic 
organizations in the selected countries, with particular attention to 
their effects on family transfers and social allowances. Second, I 
analyse the attitudes, expectations and opinions of decision makers 
regarding CCTs. Moreover, I characterize the target groups of 
conditional transfers and reveal the primary victims of the applied 
sanctions. Finally, I evaluate the effects of CCTs on school 
participation, drop-out and early school leaving using macro data 
analysis. 
The four main research questions of my dissertation are: 
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(1) How did the international financial organizations influence 
the proliferation of CCTs in the analysed European 
countries? 
(2) Why did governments prefer CCTs compared to other 
possible programmes as a way to tackle early school 
leaving and truancy? 
(3) Which social groups are the most affected by the sanctions 
of CCTs? 
(4) How certain educational indicators changed after the 





The role of international organizations 
Hungary and Bulgaria have received social development loans from 
the World Bank and the IMF since the early nineties. Belgium did 
not receive any IMF or WB loans given its economic situation. The 
loan agreements and the relating recommendations regularly 
incorporated austerity measures in the field of welfare policies. The 
governments of Hungary and Bulgaria often hesitated introducing 
the unpopular welfare reforms, despite the fact, that the IMF and the 
WB had insisted on restrictive measures in the area of welfare 
services and family benefits. The recommendations incorporated 
cutbacks in the amount of family benefits, the activation of recipients 
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and called for strictly targeted transfers that would provide only for 
the poorest families. While the governments fulfilled the majority of 
the expectation, the growing unpopularity of interventions almost 
derailed the reforms (Deacon et al. 2012:147). The analysis ha 
revealed, that neither the World Bank’s nor the IMF’s 
recommendations directly required the introduction of conditional 
family benefits; they demanded only the application of means-test.  
The exact methods and extension of certain restrictions were not 
detailed in the loan agreements and country-specific 
recommendations. According to the conclusion of the analysis, the 
general effect of financial organizations is undisputable in the 
entrenchment of neo-liberal and neo-conservative policies which 
appeared after the political transition in Bulgaria and Hungary. 
Despite the fact that the introduction of conditional transfers were 
not directly prescribed by the World Bank and the IMF, the 
education-based conditions imposed on formerly non-conditional 
family benefits, suited well the Bank’s concept on restrictive welfare 
policies. 
I also analysed the role of the European Union in the introduction of 
Bulgarian, Flemish and Hungarian CCTs. The EU imposed a quite 
large burden on the new member states by prescribing the fulfilment 
of the Lisbon Strategy’s “10 percent ESL goal” for all member states 
by 2020. Three-fourths of the new member states that joined the EU 
in 2004 and 2007 had higher or significantly higher ESL rate, than 
the targeted proportion. Those countries which are not able to fulfil 
this requirement by the deadline can easily lose their access to the 
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European Social Fund. My research shows that the emerging EU 
countries which introduced CCT programmes, are primarily those 
with high ESL rates, underfunded education systems, high youth 
employment rates and social inequality levels exceeding the EU 
average. The two exceptions are Belgium/Flanders and the United 
Kingdom. During the interviews, the Hungarian, Flemish and 
Bulgarian ministry respondents all referred to their CCTs as a tool to 
catch up to the EU’s community-level ESL goals. Nonetheless, they 
did not mention CCT as a singular method to tackle truancy and 
early school leaving. They considered their conditional transfers to 
be part of a comprehensive and multi-faceted welfare reform pack. 
 
Governmental and social expectations 
According to Inglot (2008), the eastern European states wanted to be 
more liberal than the most liberal western European and North 
American countries. As a result, they started copying the neoliberal 
and neoconservative Anglo-Saxon welfare policies.  Ferge (2000) 
noted that welfare reforms required by the World Bank and the IMF 
would not have been developed without the consent of government 
leaders. During my research, I analysed the attitudes, expectations 
and opinions of governmental representatives regarding the 
implementation and operation of CCTs. In Bulgaria and Hungary, I 
experienced a firm shift to the direction of a paternalistic and 
punitive social policy. In this model, the beneficiary families and 
children are blamed for truancy and early school leaving and the 
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significance of their individual responsibility is rather exaggerated 
compared to the responsibility of the government and the 
community.  
Besides the attitudes of decision makers, I identified a latent 
cooperation between the prevailing governments and social groups 
with considerable economic power in the implementation and 
maintenance of CCTs. This consensus focuses on punitive social 
policy measures against the poor and other marginalized groups. The 
need for restrictive social policies can appear in times of economic 
crises in particular, when the middle class is becoming poorer and 
everyday endeavours for the scarce resources become tougher.  
My findings underscore Graham’s 1994 hypothesis: when the 
pressure of international organizations meets with a firm social 
motivation for the cutback of social allowances, the eastern 
European governments are likely to turn to conditional cash transfer 
practices. On the one hand, this kind of intervention verifies the 
government’s commitment to the international creditors, showing 
that they are serious about reforming their welfare system. On the 
other hand, CCT serves as a tool for satisfying the growing social 
tensions and expectations for the punishment of the poor. 
 
Victims of sanctions 
The analysis of the socioeconomic characteristics of sanctioned 
families reveals that these social groups are quite accurately 
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identifiable in all countries. The main target groups of sanctions are: 
(1) families of students attending vocational schools, (2) groups 
living in disadvantaged regions, and (3) groups that belong to an 
ethnic minority. 
The primary victims of sanctions are students attending vocational 
secondary schools or special vocational schools. In their age -group 
(14-18 years of age) the effect of parental influence becomes weaker 
and the influence of the peer-groups grow significantly (Mayer 
2008). Children who attend vocational schools have poorer 
socioeconomic characteristics compared to other children in their age 
-group. The poverty rate, early school leaving rate and drop-out rate 
among these children are significantly higher in all analysed 
countries. A a result these children belong by to the target groups of 
the means-tested Flemish Schooltoelagen and Bulgarian Child 
Allowance programmes. According to the interviews, their 
proportion in the sanctioned group is much higher than their 
proportion among all beneficiaries. Though the Hungarian School 
Allowance is not means-tested, vocational school students and their 
families are the majority in the sanctioned group (Lannert et al. 
2012).  
Belonging to an ethnical minority significantly increases the 
probability of becoming a victim of sanctions. In Hungary, Roma 
people are particularly over-represented among the victims of 
sanctions (Friedman et al. 2009). In Bulgaria the proportion of the 
Roma, Turkish and Middle Eastern minorities is much higher in the 
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sanctioned group than their proportion among all CA beneficiaries 
(World Bank 2009a, Bulgarian interviews 2013). In Flanders, 
migrants coming from the third world are also overrepresented 
among Schooltoelagen beneficiaries and especially so among the 
sanctioned ones (Stassen 2012, Flemish ministry interviews 2013). 
The third feature that increases the probability of being sanctioned is 
the regional characteristic of beneficiaries. In Hungary, the 
proportion of early school leavers and drop-out children is 
significantly higher in the disadvantaged North Hungarian Region 
than in the western regions of the country and in the capital (Lantai 
2011, Lannert et al. 2012). In Bulgaria, the proportion of early 
school leavers is particularly high in the impoverished North 
Western Territory (Bulgarian ministry interviews 2013, Eurostat 
2013). In Flanders, the problem is characteristic of big cities: ESL 
rates of Brussels, Ghent or Antwerp are three to four times higher 
than the national average (Stassen 2012). 
To sum up: Although the CCTs’ general conditions are compulsory 
for all beneficiaries, sanctions are primarily imposed on people 
living in disadvantaged rural regions (or big city slums), attending 
poor-quality schools or belonging to an ethnic minority. 
Programme effects 
The programme’s income effect is the most significant in Hungary 
among the three analysed countries. Hungarian School Allowance is 
a quite important income source for the poor, particularly among 
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single parents and families with more than three children (Kovács 
and Pillók 2014:46). The Flemish Schooltoelagen has a rather slight 
income effect because of its relatively low amount, particularly 
among families with kindergarten-age children. The Bulgarian Child 
Allowance provides - in average - one fifth of the total income of 
poor families (World Bank 2009a:17). As a result, the Hungarian and 
Bulgarian programmes are able to quite significantly alleviate 
poverty, while the Flemish transfer only has a small poverty 
reduction effect. For this purpose, families can receive the universal 
child benefit or other welfare transfers in Belgium. 
None of the analysed programmes was able to improve early school 
leaving index; moreover ESL indicators became slightly worse after 
the first few years of introduction. Long-term improvement in early 
school leaving can only be seen in the Bulgarian case. However it 
would be rather difficult to establish to what extent this improvement 
was due to the implementation of conditions on Child Allowance. 
The school participation index of children beyond the compulsory 
schooling -age (school maintenance effect) did not change 
significantly after the introduction of CCTs in any of the analysed 
cases. In Flanders, school participation of the affected group was 
very high (at around 100%) before introducing Schooltoelagen and it 
remained at the same level after the implementation as well. In 
Hungary, one can see a slight improvement in the school 
participation of children beyond the compulsory schooling -age after 
the introduction of School Allowance. However the country still has 
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the worst school maintenance indicator (64.8%) in the EU. In 
Bulgaria, there was a slight improvement after the implementation of 
Child Allowance. As a result - the country’s school maintenance rate 
reached the EU’s average (showing a small growth from 80.6% to 
81.5%). 
According to government reports, School Allowance was able to 
reduce short-term school drop-out in Hungary by 23 000 cases in the 
first year of its operation. However the data collection method of the 
ministry is quite ambiguous (Lannert et al. 2012). At the same time, 
there was significant growth in the number of long term drop-outs 
after the introduction of School Allowance, according to the reports 
of the ministry (Lantai 2011:10). The field experiences of Bulgarian 
ministry and NGO representatives reveal that drop-out cases have 
undisputedly decreased in the country over the past few years. 
However, this trend cannot be verified without reliable impact 
studies. In Flanders, based on the data collection of the Ministry of 
Education, the school drop-out rate slightly increased from 1.2 per-
cents to 1.5 per-cent following the year of Schooltoelagen’s 
introduction (TÁRKI 2013b:42). 
To sum up: the analysed conditional cash transfers were not able to 
effectively improve school maintenance or tackle truancies and early 
school leaving in the examined countries. While these indicators 
showed slight improvements in some instances, it is quite difficult to 
measure whether these improvements are the results of CCTs or 
originate from other socio-economic trends. 
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